Objective: To explore the accounts and perspectives of junior doctors who were offered an HIV test by their employing National Health Service (NHS) trust and discuss ethical issues posed by this new policy. Design: Qualitative in-depth interview study. Setting: 4 NHS hospital trusts. Participants: 24 junior doctors who had been offered an HIV test as part of their pre-employment occupational health checks. Results: The manner in which HIV tests were offered to junior doctors varied both between and within the NHS (...) trusts. Overall, the doctors were highly critical of the way the HIV test was offered. Recurrent themes surrounding a lack of discussion and information regarding the indications for the test and implications of a positive result influenced the the doctors’ perception of their experiences. As a consequence of the shortcomings of how the test was offered, most of the doctors held the misperception that HIV testing was mandatory and many felt unable to decline the test. The majority of doctors referred to patient protection as adequate justification for being offered an HIV test. Conclusions: Junior doctors offered an HIV test under new Department of Health occupational health guidance were disparaging about how the test was offered. The findings of this study affect thousands of junior doctors in the UK, and the impact of these results is extensive. Participants’ suggestions regarding how the process of offering an HIV test can be improved are discussed and ethical issues regarding the new Department of Health policy are highlighted. (shrink)

Purpose. The study seeks to clarify the preconditions for moral and legal decision-making based on the identification of axiological foundations that correlate with the moral perceptions of good and evil and psychological phenomena such as emotions. Theoretical basis of the study is to apply comparative, axiological, systemic methods. This methodological approach allows us to analyze and disclose the essence of the process of moral and legal decision-making on the basis of certain axiological prerequisites and enables to substantiate the connection between (...) the axiological and psychological aspects of taking moral and legal decisions. Originality of the work is to broaden the perceptions of the processes and mechanisms for making moral and legal decisions, which are based on the axiological dimension, in particular on the system of reference individual and social values. The study shows that every necessary moral and legal decision taken by a person is futurologically balanced in the emotional sense, rationally reasoned and morally perceptible in the context of man’s beliefs about good and evil, and realized with necessity in the personal system of reference values that determines the style and manner of individual and social behaviour in the context of material and spiritual values and is an axiological foundation for making all types of moral and legal decisions. Conclusions. Moral and legal decision-making is a social process that is connected with such a social essence of a person as rationality, which gives an opportunity to act axiologically. A person makes moral and legal decisions in a complex way, based on the unity of the moral, axiological and psychological aspects of his worldview, which are grounded on the system of reference values. (shrink)

Of the many questions to which the RST has given rise, I should like to single out two groups.

In his discussion of the tragic act in Poet. 14. 1453b15 ff. Aristotle separates the pity which we feel at mere suffering from pity roused by the way in which this suffering is or will be brought about. The revenge of an enemy is not in itself pitiable. We pity, if victim and agent are closely related to one another as members of the same family, but only if the action is of a certain kind. Four possible ways of presenting (...) the tragic act are therefore distinguished: attempted but not performed, with knowledge of the relevant facts ; performed with knowledge ; performed but in ignorance, recognition following later ; attempted in ignorance but not performed, since recognition occurs in time to prevent it. Of these four variations the first is censured on the ground that it is morally shocking without being tragic, since it lacks πάθος. The second is mentioned in b27 as the favourite of the older poets, but is here passed over without comment. The third is explicitly approved on the ground that it avoids moral shock and has the emotional κπληξις of the recognition. But for some reason which he does not state, Aristotle prefers the last, where recognition is in time to prevent the tragic suffering from actually taking place. (shrink)